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I. THE ISSUE
For several decades, U.S. policy in telecommunications and electronic
mass media focused on the encouragement of competition. This policy,
usually known as deregulation but more accurately described as
liberalization, is aimed at an opening of the market to competitors and a
reduction of market power. There were numerous elements and
proceedings to this policy by the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC"), the states' public service commissions and legislatures, the
courts, and Congress. Of these actions, none was more comprehensive than
*Professor and Director, Columbia Business School, Columbia Institute for TeleInformation.
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the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act").
What has been the impact of this policy? In this Essay, I will focus on
one dimension: the impact of liberalization on market concentration.
This question has acquired some urgency in light of the meltdown in
the telecommunications sector following the boom years of the 1990s. That
downturn may be temporary, and the industry will recover. But the more
fundamental issue is that the telecommunications industry may have
entered into a pattern of boom-bust cycles.
While business cycles are traditional to many industries, in
telecommunications they are a new phenomenon. Telecommunications
used to be less volatile than the economy as a whole. It grew steadily, with
long planning horizons hardly ruffled by the business cycle. But today, in
sharp contrast, the telecommunications sector is potentially more volatile
than the economy, more like the airline business and less like water
utilities.
Perhaps the major reason for instability has been the fundamental
economic characteristic of many network industries with high fixed costs
and low marginal costs. The telecommunications industry is characterized,
on the supply side, by huge investments followed by tiny costs of serving
additional customers, plus positive network externalities on the demand
side. This creates economies of scale, scope, and networking. The resultant
incentives are to be large and to expand early, which in the aggregate
creates industry-wide overcapacity. Price competition then drives down
prices to unprofitable levels. In telecommunications, price differentiation
and asset redeployment are difficult, much harder than for airlines. Bust
cycles follow. We have encountered the first of these cycles, but surely not
the last, because the factors of instability will remain: low marginal costs,
high fixed costs, inelastic demand, positive network externalities, lags in
supply, disinvestment and regulation, and a Wall Street short-term
perspective that amplifies industry cycles.
If instability will be part of the environment, what will
telecommunications companies do? The textbook responses are to cut
costs, lower prices, differentiate products, and increase innovation. But
these strategies can be expensive and will quickly be matched by
competitors, which will leave every supplier firm even worse off.
The other major strategy will therefore be to raise prices above
competitive levels, and to reduce competition and the commodification that
lowers profitability and future investments. To do so requires market power
by a single firm or an oligopoly.
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II. THE CHANGING INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
We have, so far, concluded that industry concentration is a likely
response to competition. Let us now turn to the empirical evidence for such
concentration in telecommunications and related information industries. To
provide an empirical answer, we looked at the market concentration trends
in the American information sector for 100 separate industries.I Examples
for such industries are long-distance telecommunications, cellular mobile
communications, broadcast TV, cable TV, film distribution, daily
newspapers, and Internet service providers. For each of these industries, we
tracked and calculated individual firms' market shares and revenues in this
particular industry, using a variety of sources, for a period of twenty years.
These market shares were then used to calculate concentration indices
and to follow them over time. The major concentration index used was 2the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHL") of the U.S. Department of Justice.

HHI=

i=' S

Where f = number of firms participating in an industry; Si = each
firm's market share; i = firm in a given industry
The U.S. government's antitrust enforcement guidelines classify market
concentrations according to their HHI score:
HHI < 1,000: Unconcentrated Market
1,000 < HHI: Moderately Concentrated Market
1,800 < HHI: Highly Concentrated Market
The HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares. For example, if a
market is shared by three firms with 30% each, and five firms of 2% each,
the HHI is 3 x 900 + 5 x 4 = 2720.
We then tracked these indices of concentration over time, from the
years 1983 and 1984, just before and just after the AT&T divestiture. The
1. See Eu M. NOAM, MEDIA CONCENTRATION IN AMERICA (forthcoming 2006)
(detailing the research conducted).
2. A second index was also used to cross-check the HHI. The C4 index is the
combined share of the top four firms in a market.
4

C4

J

=

i

s..

Where: Si = firm's i market share of a given industry j, where firms are ordered by size of
market share.
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year 1996 was the important midpoint, permitting a comparison of the
trends preceding and following the 1996 Act.
We then proceed to aggregate the individual industries along the
dimensions of broader sectoral categories such as telecommunications or
mass media, and along the dimensions of regulated industries, such as
whether they are regulated telecommunications industries or not. The
weighted aggregate HHI is defined as:
n

WAHIZ

m.

f

a

Where j = an industry; mj = total revenue of an industry; Si = each
firm's market share of an industry; n = number of industries in a specific
subset of the information sector;f= number of firms in an industry.3
We look at the four major subsectors of the information sector: (1)
Telecommunications, (2) Mass Media, (3) Internet, (4) Information
Technology ("IT"). For each of those sectors, we define two categories of
industries: (a) Regulated (e.g., local telecommunications, TV stations); (b)
Unregulated (e.g., film distribution, fax machines).
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
For
the
telecommunications
industries, the findings can be seen in
4

Graph 1.

3. The formula for the C4 aggregation that is used as a cross-check
n

4

WC4k=z
M
s
j-1E Mj i=1i
Wherej = a industryj within a larger segment
mj =total revenue of an industryj
i= firm in an industry
Si = market share of firm in a given industry
k = segment of industries
n = number of industries
4. Regulated telecommunications industries include: local service, long-distance
service, international service, mobile telephony, radio dispatch, paging, backbones, and
broadband providers. Unregulated telecommunications industries include: handsets, fax
machines, mobile handsets, PBX, central office switches, multiplexers, fiber optical cable,
copper wire and cable, microwave equipment, cellular infrastructure, and IP telephony
providers.
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Graph 1: Telecom Industries Market Concentration
(HHI)
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Points below the lower horizontal line are below HHI of 1000, i.e.,
in the range of unconcentrated industries. HHI points above the upper
horizontal line are in the concentrated range of >1,800. Unregulated
telecommunications industries decline in concentration in the 1980s, after
the AT&T divestiture, which opened equipment and long-distance markets.
The trend is flat after 1988, and industry concentration is high. After 2001,
with the large equipment makers in decline, market concentration dropped
still further.
But most interesting is the concentration trend of the regulated
telecommunications industries: starting at highly concentrated levels in the
early 1980s, overall concentration declines, especially after the 1983-84
AT&T divestiture, but also thereafter until 1996-the year of the
deregulatory 1996 Act. Around that time, the concentration level is at its
lowest, though barely touching the bottom range of high concentration. But
following that period, concentration rises again.
We also conducted similar calculations for the mass media
industries.5 Several of these were also affected by the 1996 Act. Graph 2

5. The category of regulated mass media industries includes: TV prime time
production, radio stations, TV stations, DBS providers, cable TV operators, and TV
networks. The category of unregulated but materially affected industries includes: DBS
equipment, cable TV set-top converters, radio networks, TV syndication, cable TV
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Graph 2: Market Concentration of All Regulated
Information Sector Industries
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The concentration of regulated mass media industries first declines
in the 1980s, is flat in the early 1990s, and rises around 1996 and continues
to do so until 2004-05. Its levels are much lower than those for
telecommunications industries. Regulated mass media industries
concentration increased steadily, from low levels in the 1980s and early
1990s-maintaining low levels perhaps by regulation-and rose rapidly
after 1996, which experienced an intermediate level of concentration.
Concentration levels for both regulated telecommunications and regulated
mass media have increased steadily after 1996.
To contrast these findings, we next look at the unregulated mass
media and telecommunications sectors and also at the Internet and IT
subsectors, both of which are unregulated. The findings in Graph 3 show
that unregulated industries' concentration was mostly flat after 1996. The
exceptions were the Internet industries that consolidated and moved to a

channels, pay TV channels, and music cable channels. The category of unregulated mass
media industries includes: video game hardware, PC entertainment software, games
software, television sets, VCR players, DVD players, PVR players, camcorders, CD players,
audio systems and radio, movie production and distribution, movie theater chains, home
video, video rental, music publishing, performance rights, record labels and distributors,
music retailers, daily newspapers, educational books, trade and paperback books, other
books, books retailing, magazines, academic journals, printing services, MP3 players, media
player software, online book retailing, and online information services.
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model, in each subindustry, to dominance by a few players.6 We conduct
the same analysis for the Internet sector in Graph 3.7
Graph 3: Market Concentration of All Unregulated
Information Sub-Sectors
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Next, we group all unregulated information industries together and
contrast them with all regulated information industries.

6. Cf. Eli M. Noam, OXFORD INTERNET INST., The INTERNET: STILL WIDE OPEN AND
COMPETITIVE? (2003), http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/resources/publications/IB lall.pdf (examining
the competitive pressures of the internet market).
7. Internet industries include: backbones and broadband providers, media player
software, intemet search engines, portals, and browser software. Industries that are
unregulated but materially affected by regulation include: ISPs, IP telephony providers, and
internet working equipment.
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Graph 4: Market Concentration of All Regulated and
Unregulated Information Industries
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What the results show is that the concentration level in the
unregulated information industries is moderate and almost flat. For the
regulated and affected industries, on the other hand, concentration is high
and declining in the 1980s and early 1990s, and rising after 1996. It is still
lower than it was after the AT&T divestiture.
A.

Vertical Concentration
Next, we look at vertical concentration trends. If the same small set
of companies expanded their activity from one industry to several others,
vertical concentration would rise. Regulation might restrict such expansion,
and deregulation would permit it. What has been the trend over the past
twenty years, especially after 1996? Graph 5 shows the shares of the top
five companies in each of three sectors. Consistently, the top five
telecommunications firms have a higher sector share than that of IT and
mass media. 8 This share of the top five in telecommunications was virtually
100% in 1983. After the divestiture this share came down to about 75%. It
dropped further with new entrants and technologies such as wireless and
rose again after the mid-1990s. In the mass media sector, the share of the
top five firms rose gradually and steadily, slowing down after 2001. It
more than doubled since 1988, but is lower than for telecommunications or
IT. For IT the trend is U-shaped, rising after the mid-1990s.
8. The Internet sector is too young for such calculations to be meaningful. However,
the share of the top five firms has strongly increased.

Number 3]

POST-1996 CONSOLIDATIONS

Graph 5: Share of Top 5 Companies in their
Respective Sectors
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Local Concentration
Lastly, we look at the concentration on the local level. Using
national markets to measure concentration is not always a meaningful
measure of consumer choice. A company owning a handful of daily
newspapers might have a tiny share of the national market, yet totally
dominate its local newspaper markets. We therefore also measure the trend
of local concentration of seven local media: local telephone service,
cellular mobile service, cable TV, local newspapers, magazines, TV
stations, and radio stations. The result, for the period between 1984-2002,
is shown in Graph 5. Aggregate concentrations declined, in particular for
telecommunications. But they are quite high nevertheless, with the HHI for
local telecommunications a still very high 3,500.

548

[Vol. 58

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

Graph 6: Total Local Media Concentration (HHI)
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IV. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
Thus, we find that regulated communications industries are
substantially more concentrated than unregulated ones, and they are
increasing in concentration after 1996 following a period of
deconcentration in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Why is that so? In general, regulated industries are often
concentrated. This may be the reason, after all, that they are regulated-to
protect the public from the negative results of market power. But the
causality flows both ways. Regulation has traditionally also protected fn-ms
from competitive entry, especially in telecommunications and television
industries. The process of regulation, often captured, has been used to
stabilize industries.
But the data also shows that concentration is not merely high, but
that it has increased around the period of the deregulatory 1996 Act and
subsequent to the 1996 Act. This was certainly not the intended effect.
There are two nonrival explanations for this trend: (1) The 1996
Act raised concentration by relaxing ownership restrictions; and (2) The
1996 Act and its FCC implementations, by encouraging entry, created
incentives for companies to merge in order to re-establish control in their
markets.
There is little in the 1996 Act supporting explanation (1). It is true
that the law eliminated the national cap on ownership of radio stations and
raised it somewhat for TV stations. This resulted in higher concentrations
in these specific industries, but that was all when it comes to horizontal
merger restrictions. These two industries are only slices in the much larger
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media pie. The 1996 Act, on its face, was not so much proconcentration as
procompetition. However, the effect of such competition was to drive
companies to defensive moves along the lines of explanation (2), and
concentration became a major strategy to regain market power.
We can also conclude that in enacting the 1996 Act, public policy
projected the deconcentration trends of the 1980s and early 1990s. Further
liberalization was seen as the means to continue this trend. But as the data
show, it may have contributed to the opposite-to a more concentrated
information sector.
V. OUTLOOK
For a generation now, liberalization, deregulation, and competition
have been the keystones of telecommunications policy. But one volatile
business cycle later, competition has been giving way to consolidation.
The traditional system of regulated market power and concentration is
returning to some new equilibrium level which is not the hoped for
competition, but one of market power, maybe to a natural oligopoly instead
of a natural monopoly. And with it, inevitably, comes some regulation of
the negative effects of oligopoly. These oligopoly problems are much
harder to conceptualize and will lead to a new round of policy disputes.
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